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NOTES
DILUTING RELIEF UNDER TITLE VII:
FORD MOTOR CO. v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION-EMPLOYMENT
OFFER ABSENT RETROACTIVE SENIORITY
EFFECTIVE IN TOLLING BACKPAY
Victims of unlawful employment discrimination practices may seek ap-
propriate judicial relief under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 Courts granting remedies under this section are guided by the two
main objectives of title VII. First, the statute was designed to prohibit em-
ployment practices creating inequality on the basis of race, religion, sex, or
national origin.2 Second, title VII was intended to restore victims of em-
ployment discrimination, so far as possible, to the position they would
have been in were it not for the unlawful discrimination they suffered.3
1. As amended, § 706(g) of title VII provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may in-
clude, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue
from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commis-
sion. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the per-
son or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise
allowable. No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an
individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an
individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individ-
ual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimi-
nation on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of
section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
2. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
3. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1976); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-22 (1975). This is generally referred to as the "make
whole" objective. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 419-21.
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The backpay provision of section 706(g)4 is often invoked to further these
objectives, as well as to aid in fully compensating those who have sus-
tained injuries as a result of unlawful employment discrimination.5
The title VII claimant is under a statutory duty to use "reasonable dili-
gence" to mitigate potential damages,6 although the claimant need not ac-
cept lesser or dissimilar work.7 It is well established, however, that the
claimant forfeits his right to backpay should he refuse a valid offer of em-
4. The provision was expressly modeled after the backpay provision in § 10(c) of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 49 Stat. 454 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976)). See 110 CONo. REc. 7214 (1964) (interpretative memorandum by
Sens. Clark and Case); id at 6594 (statement of Sen. Humphrey). Section 10(c) of the
LMRA provides in pertinent part:
The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the Board shall be re-
duced to writing and filed with the Board. Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board
upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument. If upon the preponder-
ance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person
named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor
practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to
be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from
such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstate-
ment of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this
subchapter ...
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
The Supreme Court has discussed the relationship between § 706(g) of title VII and
§ 10(c) of the LMRA, observing that the latter provision served as a model for the former.
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975). The Court has looked to
decisions interpreting the backpay provision of the LMRA in deciding the scope of availa-
bility of backpay under § 706(g). Id at 419-20. In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 769-70 (1976), and in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
366 (1977), the Court relied upon decisions under the LMRA in determining availability of
seniority relief under § 706(g). See also Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593,
597 (8th Cir. 1978) (appropriate to consider decisions of the NLRB given that the backpay
provisions of title VII were modeled on the backpay provisions of the LMRA); Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1377 n.37 (5th Cir. 1974) (weight should be
given to NLRB decisions since relief provisions in § 706(g) are modeled after those in
§ 10(c) of the LMRA).
5. Backpay relief alone may not serve to adequately compensate a victim of unem-
ployment discrimination. An award of retroactive seniority, for example, may also be re-
quired to achieve the "make whole" objective of title VII. See Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1976).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
7. See Wonder Mkts., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 787, 791 (1978) (employer's offer of different
job to discriminatorily discharged employee does not terminate liability); Rushton &
Mercier Woodworking Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 123, 127 (1973) (offer of lesser employment with
provision that benefits would be settled by pending litigation does not toll backpay liability);
Good Foods Mfg. & Processing Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 418, 419 (1972) (different conditions of
employment and benefits renders an employer's offer of reinstatement ineffective to cut off
liability).
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ployment comparable to that which he was discriminatorily denied.8 An
offer of employment is considered valid if it is unconditional, and specifi-
cally, if it is not contingent upon the employee's agreement to relinquish
his right to seek backpay or other appropriate relief.9 Further, if the offer is
one of reinstatement, courts have generally ruled that in order for it to toll
further accrual of backpay liability, the offer must provide for retroactive
seniority." Retroactive seniority includes both the job benefits that the
claimant earned prior to the employer's unlawful discrimination as well as
those that accrued from the time of discrimination up to the offer of
reinstatement.
An offer of employment incorporating retroactive seniority for a victim
of unlawful hiring practices presents a different situation." The title VII
claimant who is discriminatorily refused employment will not have earned
any job benefits with the discriminating employer. An offer which pro-
vides for retroactive seniority would therefore include those job benefits
the title VII claimant would have earned in the absence of the discrimina-
tory hiring practice. The question arises whether a provision for retroac-
tive seniority is a requirement of a valid employment offer for title VII
hiring discriminatees. In Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,'2 the United States
Supreme Court first considered what an employer charged with hiring dis-
crimination must do to terminate further accrual of backpay relief under
8. See NLRB v. Arduini Mfg. Corp., 394 F.2d 420, 423-24 (1st Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
9. See NLRB v. St. Mary's Sewer Pipe Co., 146 F.2d 995, 996 (3d Cir. 1945). Simi-
larly, the offer cannot be conditioned on the employee's agreement to abandon unfair labor
practice charges against the employer. See Denver Fire Reporter & Protective Co., 119
N.L.R.B. 1187, 1188 (1957). Finally, in order for an offer to be valid, it must be for essen-
tially the same job which the employee held before he or she was discharged or for which
the employee had earlier applied. See A.W. Behney Constr. Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1087
(1976).
10. See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 164, 166 (9th Cir. 1972), afd, 414
U.S. 168 (1973); NLRB v. Hilton Mobile Homes, 387 F.2d 7, 10-11 (8th Cir. 1967); Mutual
Maintenance Serv. Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 211, 217 (1979), enforcement denied on other grounds,
632 F.2d 33, 38-39 (7th Cir. 1980); Marlene Indus. Corp., 234 N.L.R.B. 285, 291 (1978);
Moro Motors Ltd., 216 N.L.R.B. 192, 193 (1975); Good Foods Mfg. & Processing Corp., 195
N.L.R.B. 418, 419 (1972). See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 769-70
(1976) (citing cases); Globe Molded Plastics Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1044 (1973).
11. Decisions fashioning relief under title VII and the LMRA for victims of employ-
ment discrimination are almost uniformly concerned with offers of reinstatement and not
offers of initial employment. In Frankr, however, the Court recognized the importance of
reconciling the remedies available to persons alleging discrimination as a result of a dis-
charge with those available upon a failure to hire. 424 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1976). See also
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 US. 177, 187 (1941).
12. 102 S. Ct. 3057 (1982).
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section 706(g).13 In a six to three decision, the Court held that, absent
"special circumstances," the employer can toll potential backpay liability
by unconditionally offering the claimant the job previously sought without
also offering retroactive seniority.' 4
The case arose when the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) brought suit against Ford Motor Company (Ford) 5 for violating
section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 The EEOC alleged that
Ford had practiced gender discrimination against several women in its hir-
ing policy at a parts warehouse, and it sought injunctive relief and backpay
retroactive to the women's employment application dates. Two of the wo-
men Ford refused to hire returned to work for their former employer.
Subsequently, Ford unconditionally offered them the jobs it had previ-
ously denied them. Ford did not, however, offer the women retroactive
seniority. Both women rejected Ford's offers.
The district court found that Ford had followed a discriminatory hiring
policy, and awarded the women backpay. 7 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.'" Both courts held that the rejec-
tion of Ford's unconditional job offer, which did not provide for retroac-
tive seniority, did not terminate further accrual of backpay relief.
The Supreme Court reversed. 9 It held that, absent "special circum-
stances," rejection of a simple unconditional offer of employment for the
job previously sought tolls ongoing accrual of backpay liability.2" Writing
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). See supra note 1.
14. 102 S. Ct. at 3069.
15. The suit was brought by the EEOC pursuant to § 706(0(1) of title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). This section empowers the
EEOC to bring a civil action against any respondent which is not a governmental entity
provided that within thirty days after the filing of a discrimination charge, the Commission
is unsuccessful in securing an acceptable conciliation agreement from the respondent.
16. As amended, § 703(a) of title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
17. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1288 (W.D.N.C. 1978);
see infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
18. 645 F.2d 183 (1981); see infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
19. 102 S. Ct. 3057 (1982).
20. Id at 3069.
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for the majority, Justice O'Connor maintained that such a rule encourages
voluntary compliance on the part of employers to eradicate effects of em-
ployment discrimination.2 She also asserted that it is in almost all cir-
cumstances consistent with title VII's objective of making injured
claimants whole.22 Finally, the majority claimed that such a rule does not
threaten the interests of incumbent employees.23
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented.24
He criticized the majority for failing to address adequately the circum-
stances of the claimants before the Court, 5 and for severely undermining
the lower courts' traditional discretion to award equitable relief for victims
of employment discrimination. 6 Blackmun asserted that the decision
would force title VII claimants to accept "cheap offers" of employment.27
It thus would perpetuate the ill effects of employment discrimination and
the accompanying injuries suffered by its victims.2"
This Note will outline the historical trend of favoring an award of the
most complete relief possible for victims of employment discrimination
through a discussion of case law under title VII and the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA).29 It will examine the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC and suggest that the Court's imposition of
a rigid rule upon lower courts to toll backpay liability reverses the trend.
Finally, the Note will consider the impact of this rule upon future title VII
litigants. It will conclude that while the rule may vindicate the rights of
most victims, it will fall short of making whole those discriminatees who
have found alternative work and have accrued some seniority prior to re-
ceiving an unconditional offer of employment absent retroactive seniority.
I. THE HISTORICAL TREND OF FAVORING AN AWARD OF THE MOST
COMPLETE RELIEF POSSIBLE UNDER TITLE VII
A. Albemarle and Franks. Backpay and Retroactive Seniority Relief
under Section 706(g)
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody3" is one of two prominent United States
21. Id at 3064.
22. Id at 3068.
23. Id at 3069-70.
24. Id at 3071.
25. Id at 3078.
26. Id at 3076.
27. Id at 3075.
28. Id
29. The backpay provision is in § 10(c) of the LMRA, 49 Stat. 454 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976)). See supra note 4.
30. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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Supreme Court cases that address relief for victims of employment dis-
crimination provided by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3'
Before Albemarle, circuit courts failed to agree as to the scope of a trial
judge's discretion to award backpay under the Act. Some courts recog-
nized broad discretion on the part of a trial court to do so.32 Others se-
verely limited the circumstances under which a trial court could deny
backpay relief for victims of discrimination. 3
The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits relied upon the Supreme Court's
decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 34 and limited a trial
court's discretion to fashion backpay awards.31 In Newman, the Court de-
vised a standard which incorporated a preference in favor of awarding
attorney's fees under title II of the Civil Rights Act. 36 The Court held that
attorney's fees should "ordinarily" be awarded to a plaintiff who is suc-
cessful in obtaining an injunction against discrimination in public accom-
modations.37 Only under "special circumstances" can a trial court deny an
award of attorney's fees. 38 The three circuits applied the Newman stan-
dard by analogy to the backpay provision under title VII and ruled that
backpay should be awarded in all but special circumstances.39 The 4l-
bemarle Court recognized the applicability of the Newman standard to the
title VII provision governing discretionary award of attorney's fees." It
rejected application of this standard to the backpay provision, however,
31. For a full discussion of the other prominent Supreme Court case in this area, Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), see infra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
32. See Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Shaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc.,
462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972).
33. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Head v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co.,
474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), Yacated, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
34. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
35. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
36. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 204(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1976).
37. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. at 402.
38. Id (circumstances which would render such an award "unjust").
39. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 254 (5th Cir. 1974);
Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 876 (6th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle
Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973).
Because of the compensatory nature of a back pay award and the strong congres-
sional policy embodied in Title VII, a district court must exercise its discretion as
to back pay in the same manner it must exercise discretion as to attorney fees
under Title II of the Civil Rights Act. . . . Thus, a plaintiff or a complaining class
who is successful in obtaining an injunction under Tide VII of the Act should
ordinarily be awarded back pay unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust.
Albemarle, 474 F.2d at 142 (footnote omitted).
40. 422 U.S. at 415.
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and opted to devise a new standard."
In Albemarle, present and former employees brought a race discrimina-
tion suit against their employer and union. 2 The employees sought in-
junctive relief for injuries sustained following violations of section
703(a).43 The Supreme Court resolved the conffict among circuit courts
concerning discretionary award of backpay and established a new stan-
dard specifically applicable to the backpay provision under section 706(g).
The Court ruled that "[gliven a finding of unlawful discrimination,
backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally,
would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimi-
nation throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suf-
fered through past discrimination."" The Court further declared that a
trial court must "carefully articulate its reasons" for denying backpay
relief.
45
The Albemarle Court relied upon the legislative history of the title VII
backpay provision and the relationship of this provision to the backpay
provision of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) to devise its
new standard.' It reasoned that while both backpay provisions are discre-
tionary, their purpose is both to eliminate discriminatory employment
practices and to compensate victims of unlawful discrimination.47 There-
fore, the trial judge is to award backpay if, in his judgment, an award will
further the twin statutory objectives of title VII.as He is not to be deterred
from awarding complete backpay when an employer raises a good faith
defense. 49 The Albemarle Court emphasized title VII's concern with the
41. The new standard is set forth infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
42. Unions are subject to statutory liability if they operate a hiring hall or hiring office,
or if they have fifteen or more members. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). See supra note 16.
44. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
45. Id at n.14.
46. For a discussion of the relationship between the backpay provisions of title VII and
of the LMRA, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
47. 422 U.S. at 419-21.
48. Id at 417-18.
49. Id at 422. Title VII provides complete immunity for employers who rely in good
faith upon guidelines published by the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)(l) (1976). A good
faith defense, however, is permitted only a narrow role under the statute. See Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 423 n.17. See also Davidson, "Back Pay"Awards Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 741, 746 (1973) (Congress
intended a narrowly defined good faith defense under title VII).
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion inAlbemarle, suggested that he would consider
reliance upon a state's female protective labor statute a permissible defense under title VII.
422 U.S. at 448. See also Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973);
Manning v. General Motors Corp., 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946
1983]
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consequences of employment discrimination." Writing for the majority,
Justice Stewart reasoned that Congress directed the thrust of the statute to
the resultant ill effects of unlawful employment practices rather than to the
employer's motivation behind such practices. 5'
The Court also looked to decisions by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) determining suitable backpay relief under the LMRA. It
concluded that backpay is fully available under the LMRA even where
illegal labor discrimination is practiced in good faith.52 Similarly, a
backpay award under title VII should not depend upon an employer's in-
tentions. Rather, it should be nearly automatic and follow hard upon a
finding of unlawful employment discrimination. 3
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., the Supreme Court applied its
Albemarle standard to an award of retroactive seniority relief to persons
who were discriminatorily denied employment.54 Several blacks brought a
class action suit against the employer and unions, alleging racially discrim-
inatory hiring practices in violation of section 703(a). 5 They sought in-
junctive, backpay, and retroactive seniority relief. The Court considered
whether seniority relief is an appropriate remedy under section 706(g) for
victims of illegal hiring discrimination. It held that not only is such relief
appropriate, but that it is presumptively necessary to achieve the "make
whole" objective of title VII56 The Franks Court ruled that "[djistrict
courts should take as their starting point the presumption in favor of 'right-
ful-place' seniority relief, and proceed with further legal analysis from that
point. . . ." Further, the Court held that seniority relief cannot be de-
nied on the speculative basis of adverse impact upon the interests of in-
cumbent employees.5" Relief can be denied only for reasons which would
(1973); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Telegraph Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 990 (1972).
50. 422 U.S. at 422. See generally Note, A New Standard to Govern the Discretionary
Back Pay Remedy Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, I1 TULSA L.J. 627 (1976).
51. 422 U.S. at 422-23 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1974);
Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1972); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373
U.S. 526, 535 (1963) (footnote omitted)).
52. Id at 422 n.16 (citing cases).
53. Albemarle's standard governing award of backpay relief has been interpreted as
mandating almost strict liability. See Note, After Albemarle: Class- Wide Recovery of Back
Pay Under Title VII, 4 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 369 (1976).
54. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). See supra note 16.
56. Franks, 424 U.S. 747, 784 (1976).
57. Id at 779 n.41.
58. Id at 774.
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not otherwise undermine the twin statutory objectives of title VII.5 9
The Franks Court reasoned that the mere hiring of a victim of discrimi-
nation falls short of the "make whole" objective.6' To achieve this objec-
tive, an award of retroactive seniority dating to the time of application for
employment is also required. The hiring discriminatee should obtain his
or her "rightful-place" in the hierarchy of seniority through which employ-
ment benefits are allocated.6' Only then would the ill effects of past dis-
crimination be eradicated.62
The Court stated that it was unaware of any instances in which the
NLRB awarded hiring relief without also awarding retroactive seniority.63
It concluded that the NLRB routinely awards seniority relief commensu-
rate with the senority which the discriminatee would have enjoyed but for
the employer's illegal employment practices.6" The Franks Court rea-
soned that there is no principled basis for providing less protection for
victims of discrimination under title VII than that accorded victims under
the LMRA.65
The Court recognized that a presumption in favor of awarding complete
retroactive seniority relief to victims of employment discrimination might
jeopardize the interests of some incumbent employees.66 Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan suggested that a sharing of the burden of past
discrimination is not inconsistent with equitable considerations.67 He
stated that equitable remedies are comprised of "what is necessary, what is
fair, and what is workable .. . ." Therefore, the majority refused to
distinguish between benefit-type and competitive-type seniority benefits,
and incorporated both types of benefits into the presumptive remedy.69
59. Id at 771, 779. The Court expressly applied the Albemarle standard governing
backpay awards to awards of seniority relief. For a definition of this standard, see supra
notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
60. 424 U.S. at 767.
61. Id at 768. "Rightful-place" seniority places the hiring discriminatee in that posi-
tion in the seniority system which he would have been in if not for the employer's discrimi-
nation. Id at 765-66. See generally Stern, Retroactive Seniority as a Remedyfor Title VII
Violations: Relief to Newly Hired and Incumbent Employees in Light of Franks V. Bowman,
22 Loy. L. REv. 923 (1976).
62. Franks, 424 U.S. at 767-68.
63. Id at 775 n.34. See, e.g., Consolidated Prod. Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 701, 703 (1971)
(order of immediate employment of discriminatorily rejected job applicant without
prejudice to retroactive seniority and other privileges).
64. 424 U.S. at 775 n.34.
65. Id
66. Id at 774.
67. Id at 777.
68. d. at 777 n.39.
69. Id. at 766-67. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, concurring in part and dis-
19831
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Benefit-type seniority benefits include pension payments, length of vaca-
tions, leaves of absence, higher rates of pay, and extent of insurance cover-
age. Examples of competitive-type seniority benefits are shift assignments,
promotions, transfers, training opportunities, prerogative in scheduling va-
cation, and order of layoff and recall.7°
The Court did not rule out the possibility that peculiar facts and circum-
stances might justify modification or denial of complete seniority relief.7
It recognized that the statutory scheme reserves the trial court discretion to
determine the most suitable relief under section 706(g).72 Should a trial
court deny complete seniority relief upon a finding of discrimination, how-
ever, it must "'carefully articulate its reasons' for so doing., 73 Thus,
Franks reaffimed the A/bemarle standard. The Court favored a presump-
tive remedy of complete competitive and benefit retroactive seniority sta-
tus under section 706(g) for victims of employment discrimination.
senting in part, each wrote opinions urging that a distinction be made between benefit-type
and competitive-type seniority status. For a discussion of these two types of seniority status,
see infra note 70 and accompanying text. The Chief Justice suggested that an award of
"front pay" could replace competitive-type seniority benefits. 424 U.S. at 781 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Front pay is an award of monetary damages to
victims which is distinct from the backpay award. Id at 777 n.38. Chief Justice Burger
declared that such an award might serve the dual purposes of eradicating discrimination and
protecting the rights of innocent incumbent employees. Id at 78 1. Justice Powell stated that
equity requires consideration of both the claims of discrimination victims and those of inno-
cent employees to determine whether an award of competitive-type seniority should be
made. Id at 790 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Both Burger and
Powell, however, supported the majority's presumptive remedy of benefit-type seniority.
70. Competitive status seniority is aptly described in the following passage from Stacy,
Title VII Seniority Remedies in a Time of Economic Downturn, 28 VAND. L. REv. 487, 490
(1975), quoted with approval in Franks, 424 U.S. at 766-67 (footnotes omitted):
Included among the benefits, options, and safeguards affected by competitive status
seniority, are not only the promotion and layoff, but also transfer, demotion, rest
days, shift assignments, prerogative in scheduling vacation, order of layoff, pos-
sibilities of later transfer to avoid layoff, "bumping" possibilities in the face of
layoff, order of recall, training opportunities, working conditions, length of layoff
endured without reducing seniority, length of layoff recall rights will withstand,
overtime opportunities, parking privileges, and, in one plant, a preferred place in
the punch-out line.
71. 424 U.S. at 779.
72. Id Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, urged that by creating
a presumptive remedy of seniority relief, the Franks Court was in effect undermining the
district court's discretion to fashion equitable relief. Id at 785-86. However, it has been
suggested that limiting the courts' discretion in areas where the NLRB is not similarly lim-
ited may be justified in light of the Board's greater expertise in handling employment dis-
crimination cases. See Note, Labor Law-Title VII Remedies--Constructive Seniority as an
Appropriate Remedyfor Persons DiscriminatedAgainst in Hiring-Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 36 MD. L. REv. 692, 698 (1977).
73. Franks, 424 U.S. at 774 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 421
n.14).
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Albemarle favored a presumptive remedy of a complete backpay award
under the same statutory provision. Together, these decisions established
the Supreme Court trend of favoring an award of the most complete relief
possible under title VII's general remedial provision.
B. Aftermath of Albemarle and Franks: Advancing the Trend of
Complete Relieffor Title VII Claimants
Federal courts of appeals have relied upon the Albemarle decision to
grant awards of full backpay relief under section 706(g).74 In Hairston v.
McLean Trucking Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered whether employees' rejections of promotions or trans-
fers terminated their rights to backpay. 7" The employer had previously
segregated job classifications by race. Blacks were employed as janitors
and garagemen, while whites were employed as truckdrivers.7 6 Black em-
ployees refused promotions and transfers to predominantly "white" jobs
because they would be required to sacrifice the seniority they had earned
in their earlier "black" jobs.77 The court of appeals held that the employ-
ees' refusals did not bar their claims to backpay.78 The court reasoned that
the employees were justifiably reluctant to expose themselves to further ill
effects of a discriminatory employment policy.79 In accordance with Al-
bemarle, the Fourth Circuit refused to accept the employer's good faith
defense of reliance upon a collective bargaining agreement."0 Similarly, it
placed emphasis upon rectifying the consequences of discrimination.,'
Thus, the court of appeals favored an award of complete backpay relief for
the discriminatees. It expressly relied upon the Albemarle standard of a
74. For a full discussion of Albemarle, see supra notes 30-53 and accompanying text.
75. 520 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1975).
76. Id at 229.
77. Id at 232.
78. Id
79. Id The court held that an employee could be barred from claiming backpay only if
the employee's refusal were a "free and voluntary act," one not motivated by a desire to
avoid an employer's discriminatory policy. Id See also United Transp. Union Local No.
974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976)
(refusal to commit "seniority suicide" does not foreclose backpay relief); Wonder Mkts., Inc.
& Local 1445, 236 N.L.R.B. 787 (1978) (rejection of a promotion which prejudices seniority
rights does not bar a claim to backpay).
80. Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d at 235. The court stated that collective
bargaining agreements which violate the statute are not binding. It suggested that other
means of ensuring that promoted employees would be able to adequately perform more
demanding job tasks-such as training opportunities, probationary periods, and minimum
tenure--could be made available. Id
81. Id
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presumption of such relief for proven unlawful discrimination.82
In Comacho v. Colorado Electronic Technical College, Inc. ,83 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also looked to the Albemarle
decision and awarded full backpay relief.84 An employee alleged that she
was illegally discharged on the basis of sex. She refused the employer's
subsequent offer of reinstatement because it did not include backpay. 85
The court ruled that the claimant's rejection of the offer was proper and
did not toll the further accrual of backpay liability. 6 It reasoned that a
reinstatement offer without backpay cannot "make whole" the person un-
lawfully discharged."7 According to the court, a contrary holding would
frustrate the objectives of title VII, a result explicitly rejected in
Albemarle."8
Courts of appeals have also relied upon Franks in considering suitable
awards of retroactive seniority relief. InAcha v. Beame,89 for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted the "right-
ful-place" doctrine set forth in Franks.9 In Acha, women police officers
brought a sex discrimination suit alleging that prior discriminatory hiring
practices had prevented them from gaining the seniority necessary to sur-
vive a recent layoff.9" The Second Circuit awarded retroactive seniority
from the dates that the women would have been hired absent the discrimi-
nation.92 The court rejected the employer's assertion that the award of
seniority relief accorded preference on the basis of sex. It maintained that
the award was instead a means of putting the claimants in their "rightful-
place."9 3
Claiborne v. Illinois Central Railroad94 reaffirmed the "rightful-place"
doctrine of Acha and Franks. As in Hairston, the employer involved in
Claiborne had maintained racially segregated job classifications. Carmen
82. Id at 230-31 (citing Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 416-18).
83. 590 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1979).
84. For a full discussion of Aibemarle, see supra notes 30-53 and accompanying text.
85. 590 F.2d at 889.
86. Id But see NLRB v. Betts Baking Co., 428 F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1970) (refusing to
enforce the NLRB's backpay award for a period subsequent to the expiration of an uncondi-
tional offer of reinstatement).
87. 590 F.2d at 889.
88. Id
89. 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976).
90. For a full discussion of Franks, see supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
91. 531 F.2d at 649.
92. Id at 656. The relief was contingent upon each officer's showing that, but for her
sex, she would have been hired early enough to accrue the seniority necessary to withstand
present layoffs. Id
93. Id at 655-56.
94. 583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979).
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positions were only available to white workers. Black employees declined
to accept offers of "white" carmen positions in order to preserve the senior-
ity benefits that they had acquired in their previous "black" positions.9"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that their
rejections of employment did not cut off the employer's backpay liability.96
The court of appeals reasoned that the rejections were justified because
had the employees accepted the offers, they would have been forced to
sacrifice the seniority benefits that they had already earned.97 Job offers
do not terminate backpay when they expose the claimants to additional
injuries under the employer's discriminatory hiring policy.9 8 In accord-
ance with the "rightful-place" doctrine of Franks, the court upheld com-
plete awards of retroactive seniority back to the dates when the
discriminatees were originally hired in their "black" positions.99
Hairston, Comacho, Acha, and Claiborne all involved offers of reinstate-
ment, transfer, or promotion for former or present employees. Therefore,
prior to receiving the offers, the claimants had accumulated some seniority
with the employers. The claim of a victim of illegal hiring discrimination
presents a different situation. He has not earned any seniority benefits
with the discriminating employer. Thus, the question arises as to what an
employer must do to cut off backpay liability in the situation of a claimant
who was illegally refused employment. Only the Third Circuit in Jurinko
v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co. 100 and the Sixth Circuit in Meadows v. Ford Mo-
tor Co. 101 have dealt explicitly with this question.
In Jurinko, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
ruled on a sex discrimination suit brought by two women who alleged that
they were unlawfully refused employment. The women had previously
been employed by the defendant and were discharged in 1953 by reason of
their marriages."0 2 The employer's practice of not employing married wo-
men and of discharging employed women upon their marriage was insti-
tuted after World War II in order to provide post-war "bread winners"
95. 583 F.2d at 153.
96. Id.
97. Id
98. See Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d at 132. For a full discussion of
Hairston, see supra notes 75-82.
99. 583 F.2d at 149. The court also cited the "rightful-place" doctrine as set forth in
Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976)
(perceiving the "rightful-place" theory as an equitable compromise between the counter-
vailing interests of discriminatees and those of incumbent employees). 583 F.2d at 149.
100. 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir. 1973).
101. 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
102. Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d at 1041.
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with employment.'0° The practice was lawful until the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on
the basis of sex." In 1965, the two claimants in Jurinko requested rein-
statement in their former jobs. 05 The employer refused their requests, but
unconditionally offered them jobs several years later. The job offers did
not include backpay or retroactive seniority. Both women refused the
offers.
The Third Circuit ruled that the women's refusals did not foreclose their
rights to backpay.1° It reasoned that the employer's offer did not eradi-
cate the effects of its past discrimination because it did not include
backpay or back seniority. A job offer without retroactive seniority could
adversely affect the claimants' opportunities for job advancement and their
chances of surviving layoffs.'° 7 Therefore, the women were under no duty
to accept the employer's offer. The court awarded the claimants full
backpay and retroactive seniority dating back to their applications for
employment.
0 8
In Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit distinguished between two types of seniority relief in
fashioning an award for unlawful hiring discrimination under section
706(g). "° The claimants alleged that the employer illegally refused to hire
them on the basis of their sex."10 The women sought backpay and retroac-
tive seniority relief. The Sixth Circuit compared retroactive benefit-type
seniority with competitive-type seniority and concluded that the latter in-
volves the potential burdening of innocent incumbent employees."'
Therefore, the court of appeals awarded full backpay and retroactive bene-
fit-type seniority relief to the hiring discriminatees. It remanded the issue
103. Id
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) (effective July 2, 1965). See supra note 16.
105. 477 F.2d at 1041.
106. Id at 1046.
107. Id
108. Id The decision was vacated by the Supreme Court on other grounds and re-
manded in light of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 414 U.S. 970,
971 (1973). The Third Circuit then remanded to the district court for additional findings of
fact. 497 F.2d 403, 404 (3d Cir. 1974). The case was appealed once more to the Third Circuit
and was remanded a second time to the district court with instructions to consider appropri-
ate relief following the Supreme Court's decision inAIbemarle. 528 F.2d 1214, 1216 (3d Cir.
1975).
109. 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
110. 510F.2d at 940.
111. Id at 949. The court's discussion of the differences between the two types of senior-
ity was cited with approval by Justice Powell in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 795 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For examples of the
different types of seniority, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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of competitive-type seniority to the district court with instructions to con-
sider the interests of incumbents who might be displaced should the dis-
criminatees be awarded this additional type of seniority relief." 2 The
court explicitly recognized, however, that an award of complete retroactive
competitive-type seniority relief is not prohibited by title VVII In ac-
cordance with Albemarle and Franks, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that de-
termination of suitable relief is properly left to the trial court's discretion.
The interests of both the discriminatees and innocent incumbents may
then be weighed to achieve the maximum equitable result.' 14 Thus, the
court implicitly favored an award of the most complete relief possible
under section 706(g) in light of the facts and circumstances peculiar to the
employment discrimination.
II. FORD MOTOR Co. V EEOC: REVERSING THE TREND OF
PRESUMPTIVE BACKPAY AND SENIORITY REMEDIES FOR
TITLE VII VICTIMS
In Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, "I the Supreme Court addressed the re-
quirements of a valid offer of employment for a victim of hiring discrimi-
nation. The Court ruled that a simple unconditional offer of employment
will toll the further accrual of backpay liability."' Only under "special
circumstances" will a title VII claimant be permitted to refuse an uncondi-
tional offer and preserve his or her rights to backpay relief."7 The Court,
however, failed to define the parameters of this narrow exception to what
is otherwise a rigid rule governing backpay awards under section 706(g).
The EEOC brought suit against Ford Motor Company (Ford)" I 8 for vio-
lating title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1" It charged that Ford had
practiced gender discrimination against several women in its hiring proce-
dures. The EEOC sought injunctive relief and .backpay dating from the
claimants' applications for employment. The women applied for positions
at an automotive parts warehouse in Charlotte, North Carolina, where wo-
men had never worked before. 2 ° Ford refused them employment and
112. 510 F.2d at 949.
113. Id
114. Id
115. 102 S. Ct. 3057 (1982).
116. Id at 3069.
117. Id
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). For an explanation of the conditions under which
the EEOC may bring suit, see supra note 15.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The EEOC specifically relied on 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). The language of this section is set forth supra note 16.
120. 645 F.2d 183, 185 (4th Cir. 1981).
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filled the vacancies with men possessing equal qualifications.' 2' Two of
the claimants, Judy Gaddis and Rebecca Starr, were later recalled to work
by their former employer, General Motors (GM). 22 After they had been
working for GM for six months, Ford unconditionally offered them em-
ployment but not retroactive seniority.' 23 Each of the women refused
Ford's offer. Several months later, they both lost their jobs when GM
relocated.
The district court concluded that the EEOC had established a prima
facie case of sex discrimination. 24 The court found that Gaddis and Starr
refused Ford's offer because neither wished to lose the seniority she had
accrued at GM nor to be the only woman working in Ford's warehouse.
The district court held that the refusals did not terminate their rights to
backpay because they were confronted with such a difficult decision only
as a result of Ford's earlier discrimination. 25 The women were awarded
backpay in an amount equal to the difference between that which they
would have earned had they been hired at the time of their original appli-
cations for employment and the amounts which they had actually earned
or reasonably could have earned in the meantime.'
26
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed by
divided vote.'27 The court unanimously held that Ford's failure to hire the
two women violated title VII, while one judge dissented as to the appropri-
ate relief.' 2 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court had not
121. Id at 185-86.
122. Id at 186. The suit involved two groups of women. The first group, Judy Gaddis,
Rebecca Staff, and Zettie Smith, applied for employment in 1971. The second group con-
sisted of seven women who applied for a single job vacancy in 1973.
123. Id; 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1288, 1291 (W.D.N.C. 1978). These were the
only claimants who received offers of employment from Ford.
124. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1288 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
125. Id at 1292.
126. Id Title VII provides the following formula to determine the amount of a backpay
award: "interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or
persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). This is also the backpay formula used under the LMRA. See
NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941); F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950).
127. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981).
128. Judge Hoffman dissented as to the appropriate relief. He maintained that Gaddis's
and Starr's employment with GM terminated Ford's backpay liability. Id at 203 (Hoffman,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also urged that Ford's unconditional offers
of employment tolled the backpay period. Id at 204. Finally, Hoffman stated that the wo-
men's enrollment in a full-time training program should have cut off Ford's liability. Id at
209.
It is curious that neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court addressed Judge
Hoffman's first contention regarding the effect of the claimants' employment with GM. The
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abused its discretion by continuing backpay relief for Gaddis and Starr
after they refused Ford's offers.' 29 The court reasoned that if Ford's offer
were effective to terminate the company's liability, then the women would
have been presented with an "intolerable choice."'130 Had the women re-
fused Ford's offer and remained at GM, they would have foregone their
rights to any further backpay relief. Had they accepted Ford's offer, they
would have lost their seniority rights earned at GM and faced the usual
perils accompanying a lack of seniority, such as a layoff. Thus, the court
of appeals affirmed the district court's award of full backpay retroactive to
the claimants' dates of application for employment.13 1 It remanded to the
district court for a consideration of possible additional remedies.'
32
A. Supreme Court Imposes a Rigid Rule to Toll Backpay Liability
Under Section 706(g)
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that, absent
"special circumstances," a claimant's rejection of an unconditional offer of
employment terminates his or her rights to further backpay relief.,33 Ac-
general rule under title VII is that if a discriminatee accepts permanent employment with
substantially equivalent wages, the backpay period ends with the acceptance of such work
because thereafter the victim would suffer no damages. See Butta v. Anne Arundel County,
473 F. Supp. 83, 89 (D. Md. 1979); Milton v. Bell Labs., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 502, 515 & n.19
(D.N.J. 1977). This general rule is also applied to awards of backpay under the LMRA. See
NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972
(1966); Circle Bindery, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 1185, 1187-88 (1977).
The court of appeals distinguished the situation involving Gaddis and Starr because their
work at GM was "temporary employment." 645 F.2d at 190. Judge Hoffman, however,
urged that the record made no reference to "temporary employment." Id at 203 (Hoffman,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). GM's offer of jobs to Gaddis and Starr in its
new location after the closing of the Charlotte warehouse further substantiated the conten-
tion that the GM positions were permanent. Id This suggests that Ford's backpay liability
should have ended when Gaddis and Starr were hired by GM. Indeed, even if their GM
positions were considered "temporary," an argument could be made that Gaddis and Starr
were not sacrificing much job security or seniority status when, in order to preserve their
right to backpay, they were required to accept Ford's unconditional offers of substantially
equivalent employment.
129. 645 F.2d at 196.
130. Id at 192.
131. Id at 196. The court also affirmed the backpay award for the 1973 group of seven
women. Id at 199-200. It held that their backpay period did not terminate with the layoff
of the man who had filled the position for which they had applied. Id Ford did not seek
review with respect to this group of women.
132. Id at 201.
133. 102 S. Ct. 3057, 3069 (1982). In a footnote, the Court also addressed a burden of
proof issue raised by Ford. Id at 3061 n.7. This issue involved only Smith, one of the 1971
group of three women. See supra note 122. Ford contended that the court of appeals had
erroneously imposed upon the company not only the burden of producing evidence to rebut
prima facie cases of discrimination, but also the burden of proving legitimate reasons for its
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cording to the Court, an employer is not required to provide retroactive
seniority in order for the offer to cut off his liability. While the Court
allowed the trial court some discretion in the rule's application, it sug-
gested that permissible exceptions to the rule governing backpay relief
under section 706(g) will be rare.'
34
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor first stated that the "primary
objective" of title VII is to end employment discrimination. 35 She de-
clared that legal rules consistent with other title VII provisions should
therefore be designed to encourage employers to make curative, uncondi-
tional offers of employment.' 36 The majority reasoned that if such offers
were sufficient to end backpay liability, employers would have a strong
incentive to hire claimants.' 37  The discriminatees would thus suffer
shorter periods of unemployment or underemployment prior to obtaining
a court award of the job discriminatorily denied them. The Court ex-
plained that conversely, if the rule favored by the court of appeals were
adopted, employers would have less incentive to hire claimants.' 38 They
would be faced with additional costs associated with seniority benefits and
potential labor unrest resulting from discontented incumbents.
The majority opinion then considered whether the rule tolling backpay
liability would also accomplish what it characterized as the "secondary,
fallback" objective of compensating victims.' 39 The Court examined a ti-
tle VII claimant's statutory duty to minimize damages under section
706(g)."4 It hypothesized that if Gaddis and Starr were unemployed or
employed in inferior positions to those offered by Ford, they would clearly
be required to accept Ford's offers.' 4' The Court reasoned that Ford's of-
fer need not include retroactive seniority to be effective to end its liability
because Gaddis and Starr would be required to accept another employer's
hiring discrimination. The Supreme Court stated that the district court's findings were con-
sistent with its holding in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981), concerning the allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in title VII
discrimination suits. 102 S. Ct. at 3061 n.7.
134. 102 S. Ct. at 3069 n.27. "In exceptional circumstances, the trial court, in the exercise
of its sound discretion, could give weight to such factors [as relocation costs for a replace-
ment job] when deciding whether backpay damages accrued after the rejection of an em-
ployer's offer should be awarded to the claimant." Id
135. Id at 3063 (quoting Abemarle, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
136. 102 S. Ct. at 3064.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id at 3065 (quoting.Aibemarle, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975)).
140. For a discussion of a title VII claimant's statutory duty to mitigate potential dam-
ages, see supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
141. 102 S. Ct. at 3065-66.
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similar job offer which would not include any seniority benefits. There-
fore, Ford's offer should not be "irrationally disfavored" by the claimants
notwithstanding the absence of those benefits in the unconditional offer.'42
The Court observed that irrespective of whether the claimants accepted
Ford's offer or another employer's offer, they would still remain eligible
for "make whole" relief under a court order. 143
The majority opinion also considered a hypothetical situation in which a
claimant has been able to obtain a better job than the one previously de-
nied. It concluded that the availability of such employment would termi-
nate the ongoing ill effects of the past discrimination.'" Similarly, the
Court reasoned that if a claimant were to find a substantially equivalent
job with another employer and later reject a defendant's offer, it could be
presumed that the lingering effects of the defendant's discrimination had
been eliminated.' 45 Justice O'Connor noted that in both of these hypo-
thetical situations the claimant could accept the defendant's offer and not
prejudice his or her rights to seek full court-ordered compensation.
Through its analysis of hypothetical situations, the Court determined
that the rule tolling backpay liability is, in almost all circumstances, fully
consistent with title VII's objective of making discrimination victims
whole."4 The majority conceded, however, that there might be instances
in which a claimant perceives his or her alternative job with another em-
ployer to be more attractive than the defendant's offer without a provision
for seniority, but less attractive than the defendant's offer accompanied by
seniority benefits. 147 Assuming that Gaddis and Starr were in this situa-
tion, they were indeed required to make a choice between retaining their
GM positions and accepting Ford's offers. The majority disagreed with
the court of appeal's assertion that this choice was "intolerable."'' 48 The
Court noted that the choice did not require Gaddis and Starr to forego full
compensation. It reasoned that if the women's choice was difficult, this
was because they were required to determine the probability of their pre-
142. Id at 3066.
143. Id. at 3066-67. Such relief may include backpay, retroactive seniority, and compen-
sation for injuries sustained by the claimant due to the lesser seniority prior to the court's
judgment. Id
144. Id at 3067. The Court suggested that Gaddis and Starr did consider their GM
positions superior to those they would have had at Ford were it not for Ford's discrimina-
tory hiring procedures. Id at n.24.
145. Id at 3067.
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vailing at trial.'49 Ford was not obligated to insure them against the risk
that they might lose on the merits. This would be the "perverse result,"
however, if the rule adopted by the Fourth Circuit were to prevail. 50
The Court also maintained that the Fourth Circuit's rule would have a
pernicious impact upon the interests of innocent incumbents.' 5 ' It would
place an onerous burden upon those who would be forced to yield their
seniority to claimants who have not yet proven, nor may ever prove, un-
lawful discrimination. I5 2 An innocent incumbent could be unjustly laid
off or disadvantaged. Thus, the Court concluded that the rule terminating
ongoing backpay following rejection of an unconditional offer of employ-
ment was the better one.'
5 3
The Court, however, provided a narrow exception to its new rule. There
might be "special circumstances" under which a claimant could reject an
offer and still preserve his or her rights to continuing backpay.'1 4 The
Court did not clearly define what circumstances would fall within the pur-
view of the exception. It suggested, however, that a claimant who is re-
quired to move a great distance to obtain alternative work with another
employer might be justified in refusing a defendant's subsequent offer. 155
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented.
He criticized the Court for devising a rigid rule to cut off backpay liabil-
ity.151 In accordance with Albemarle and Franks, he urged that the Court
should have applied the well-settled flexible standard of appellate re-
view. 57 Albemarle and Franks recognized the trial court's "keener appre-
ciation" of a case's facts and circumstances.55 These decisions also
established a heavy presumption of favoring full backpay awards to fur-
ther title VII's twin objectives of eradicating unlawful employment dis-
crimination and compensating victims of such discrimination. 59 In
contrast, Blackmun maintained, the Court's decision undermines a trial
court's discretion to fashion backpay awards to make individual victims of
discrimination whole. The Court's new rule governing backpay awards
149. Id at 3069.
150. Id
151. Id The Court declared that title VII permits it to consider the rights of "innocent
third parties." Id (citing cases).
152. Id at 3069-70.
153. Id at 3070.
154. Id at 3069.
155. Id at n.27.
156. Id at 3071.
157. Id (citing Albemarle, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), and Franks, 424 U.S. 747 (1976)).




implies that a trial court abuses its discretion if it does not cut off an em-
ployer's backpay liability when the employer makes an unconditional offer
of employment to a claimant.' 6°
The dissent flatly rejected the majority's contention that the rule furthers
the statutory objectives articulated in Albemarle. Addressing the objective
of eradicating discrimination, it asserted that the Court's approach autho-
rizes employers to make "cheap offers" to claimants which they cannot
reasonably accept.16 ' Blackmun reasoned that if a claimant refuses a de-
fendant's offer to retain existing job security with another employer, as
Gaddis and Starr did, the defendant has successfully terminated all future
backpay liability. Therefore, the Court's rule insulates a wrongful em-
ployer from proper liability for his illegal acts, which hinders the aim of
eliminating discrimination.
62
With regard to the second objective of compensating victims, Blackmun
applied the Court's rule to demonstrate how it failed to make Gaddis and
Starr whole for the injuries which they had suffered. He reasoned that if
they had accepted Ford's offers, the claimants may have spent many years
subordinate to other employees who, but for the discrimination, would
have been their inferiors. 163 Thus, the Court's rule forces claimants to ac-
cept job offers with a seniority disadvantage." Such a result was ex-
pressly rejected by the Court in Franks.
65
Justice Blackmun also criticized the Court for justifying its new rule
through reliance upon hypothetical situations. Regarding situations in-
volving unemployed and underemployed claimants, he noted that Gaddis
and Starr's situation was different because they fulfilled their statutory
duty to mitigate damages by taking jobs with GM. 6 6 With respect to
those situations involving claimants who find more desirable alternative
employment, Blackmun again maintained that Gaddis and Starr's situa-
tion was distinguishable. There was no proof regarding the extent to
which the claimants valued their GM jobs.167 Similarly, Justice Blackmun
faulted the Court for its preoccupation with the rights of third parties and
160. Id at 3076.
161. Id at 3075.
162. Id
163. Id (citing Franks, 424 U.S. 747, 768 (1976)). For a discussion of the "rightful-
place" doctrine set forth in Franks, see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
164. 102 S. Ct. at 3076.
165. See id at 3075. For a full discussion of Franks, see supra notes 54-73 and accompa-
nying text.
166. Id at 3077 & n.12.
167. Id at 3077.
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the potential disruption of Ford's existing seniority system. 168 He noted
that there was no evidence concerning the details of Ford's seniority sys-
tem in the lower courts. Blackmun reasoned that the majority could not
justify reversal by abstract references to third parties and classes of claim-
ants not before the Court. 1
69
Finally, Blackmun asserted that the majority failed to address the "real-
life concerns" of Gaddis and Starr.' 7 ' He criticized the Court's indiffer-
ence to the true motivating factor underlying the women's rejections of
Ford's offers-their concern with preserving job security. 7 ' Both claim-
ants had some seniority with GM, reducing the danger that they would be
laid off. Ford's offer did not provide for any seniority. An acceptance of
Ford's offer could have resulted in their being laid off shortly thereafter,
long before they would have had an opportunity to seek court-ordered re-
lief.'72 While the dissent agreed with the Court that "victims of job dis-
crimination want jobs, not lawsuits,"17 3 it underscored the fact that Gaddis
and Starr already had alternative jobs in which they had accumulated sen-
iority.174 The dissent reasoned that they should not be expected to trade in
the more secure positions with GM for uncertain employment with Ford
in which retroactive seniority could be obtained only through litigation. 75
Justice Blackmun also was disturbed that Gaddis and Starr were not
found by the Court to fall within its "special circumstances" exception to
the rule. 176 He reasoned that the loss of GM seniority was akin to the cost
of relocation for the claimant who has moved to take a replacement job. 1
77
Blackmun thus concluded that application of the Court's inflexible rule
ensures that Gaddis and Starr will not be "made whole" for the injuries
which they indisputably have suffered.'
17
168. Id
169. Id See also Franks, 424 U.S. 747, 774-75 (1976) (seniority relief for certain employ-
ees cannot be denied solely on the abstract assumption that it adversely affects other em-
ployees' interests).
170. 102 S. Ct. at 3078.
171. Id In Maslow's hierarchy of needs, security ranks second only to physical needs. A.
MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY, chs. 4-7 (1970).
172. 102 S. Ct. at 3078.
173. Id at 3079.
174. Id
175. Id
176. Id at 3076.
177. Id at n.ll.
178. Id at 3071.
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B. The Ford Motor Co. Rule Governing Backpay Awards May Not
Fuill The "Make Whole" Objective
The decision in Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC may be flawed in two major
respects. First, it failed to address adequately the facts and circumstances
surrounding the particular case. Second, the Court chose a rigid rule to
govern backpay awards. This result is inconsistent with the spirit of ex-
isting title VII case law that recognizes a trial court's unique abilities to
award the most suitable "make whole" remedy.'7 9 Together, these short-
comings increase the likelihood that future title VII litigants may not be
able to rely upon the courts for full compensation.
The O'Connor majority can be most sharply criticized for minimizing
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the claimants' rejec-
tions of Ford's offers. Although the Court finally confronted the unique
situation in which Gaddis and Starr found themselves, its examination of
their dilemma was cursory and dominated by an apparent eagerness to
justify application of its new rule.' The Court relied upon the possibility
that the claimants valued their GM jobs together with their claims to
backpay which accrued before Ford's offer more than they valued the posi-
tions originally sought from Ford together with their rights to seek full
court-ordered compensation.' In his dissent, Justice Blackmun accu-
rately noted that such an inference lacked foundation.' 82 Further, the
Court relied upon a myriad of situations involving imagined title VII
claimants.8 3 It did not look to the case's particular facts which explained
the circumstances surrounding the claimants' refusal to accept employ-
ment. Their testimony clearly revealed a fear that if they had accepted
Ford's offers, not only might they have been the only women in Ford's
warehouse, but also that the lesser seniority might have resulted in their
being laid off shortly thereafter.' 4 Therefore, it may not have been unrea-
sonable for the women to have decided not to relinquish their earned GM
179. See Franks, 424 U.S. 747 (1976);,41bemarle, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Comacho v. Colo-
rado Elec. Technical College, Inc., 590 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1979); Claibome v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979); Meadows v. Ford
Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
180. See 102 S. Ct. at 3067.
181. Id & n.24.
182. Id at 3077 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183. Id at 3065-68.
184. Id at 3078. Gaddis testified: "I had seniority [at General Motors] and I knew that I
wasn't in danger of any layoff, where if I had accepted the job at Ford Imight have workeda
week or two weeks and been laid off because I would have been low seniority. " Id (quoting
from appellate record) (emphasis added by the Court). Starr testified: "I had seniority at
General Motors. I had about fifteen people working under me. I could go to work at Ford
and work a week and I knew that they could lay me off " Id (emphasis added by the Court).
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seniority for an insecure position at Ford in which seniority rights could
have been attained only through litigation. 8 5
The extraordinary importance of seniority rights to employees has been
expressly recognized both by the drafters of title VII Is6 and the Supreme
Court. 187 In Ford Motor Co., the Court may have retreated in its failure to
attribute more weight to the "rightful-place" doctrine articulated in
Franks.' This doctrine established a heavy presumption in favor of the
appropriateness of retroactive seniority relief for a victim of discrimina-
tion. The discriminatee is presumed entitled to those seniority benefits
which he or she would have had were it not for the discrimination.' 8 9 The
presumption of retroactive seniority relief along with the presumption of
backpay relief established in Albemarle are remedial approaches designed
to afford discrimination victims the most complete, "make whole" relief
possible.' 90 It is anomalous, then, that the remedial provisions of seniority
and backpay relief should be interpreted by the Court in a way which will
exert pressure upon discrimination victims to sacrifice important seniority
rights in order to obtain the positions they were unlawfully denied. In
effect, Gaddis and Starr were asked to forego their GM seniority to avoid a
truncated backpay award. Ford's liability is thus reduced, but the women
arguably are not accorded the backpay and seniority relief which is right-
fully theirs.
Ford's offers of employment, unaccompanied by a provision for senior-
ity, possibly did not end the ill effects of its past discrimination. Had Gad-
dis and Starr accepted the offers, they would have been placed in a
185. The question is one of reasonableness when determining whether an employee has
adequately mitigated damages. The claimant is obligated to "do that which a reasonable
man would do under the circumstances to limit the amount of the damages." Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916) (citations omitted). The claimant is not required
to take on great risks or onerous burdens in order to reduce the liability of the wrongful
employer. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
186. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 5893 (1964) (remarks of Rep. McCulloch); id at 6564
(remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
187. See Franks, 424 U.S. 747, 766-68 (1976). For a discussion of the importance of
seniority status and its accompanying benefits, see generally Poplin, Fair Employment in a
Depressed Economy.- The Layoff Problem, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 177 (1975); Stacy, Title VII
Seniority Remedies in a Time of Economic Downturn, 28 VAND. L. REv. 487 (1975); Aaron,
Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532
(1962).
188. Franks, 424 U.S. 747, 768 (1976). For a full discussion of Franks, see supra notes 54-
73 and accompanying text.
189. 424 U.S. at 779 n.41. For a discussion of the Franks presumption of seniority relief,
see supra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
190. Albemarle, 422 U.S. 405, 421 & n.14 (1975). For a discussion of theAlbemarle pre-
sumption of backpay relief, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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seniority disadvantage. As explicitly recognized by the Franks Court, they
would have spent many years subordinate to employees who, but for
Ford's discrimination, would have been their inferiors. '9' Their lesser sen-
iority would have resulted in reduced health, life, vacation, retirement, and
unemployment insurance benefits. They would have had fewer opportuni-
ties for promotion, transfer, and training. While they would have pre-
served their rights to seek the retroactive seniority status due them, Gaddis
and Starr may have spent many years in litigation before being able to
enjoy the benefits associated with their "rightful-place." Indeed, the Court
recognized the extended period of time it frequently takes title VII claim-
ants to obtain satisfaction in the courts. 92 Therefore, rather than making
the claimants whole, acceptance of Ford's offers might have perpetuated
the ill effects of its original unlawful discrimination. As the dissent aptly
stated, forcing title VII claimants to accept incomplete offers of employ-
ment is "fundamentally incompatible" with the twin objectives of the
statute. 1
93
The dissent also correctly criticized the Court for sharply limiting a trial
court's discretion to award suitable relief for individual discriminatees.
194
The district court found that Gaddis and Starr had not acted unreasonably
in rejecting Ford's offers. 195 The court therefore refused to truncate their
backpay awards.' 96 The court of appeals, in accordance with the Supreme
Court's directive in Albemarle and Franks, applied flexible principles of
appellate review and affirmed the findings of the district court. 197 In con-
trast, Ford Motor Co. stripped the district court of its equitable discretion-
ary powers. The imposition of a rigid rule tolling backpay liability is
incompatible with the tradition of providing a full examination of facts
and circumstances to achieve most completely title VII's objectives.
Although the majority's reasoning may have been flawed, the dissenting
opinion is not immune from criticism. While Justice Blackmun may have
persuasively analyzed possible disadvantages of the Court's rule, he failed
to acknowledge that the rule will serve to vindicate adequately the rights of
the majority of title VII claimants. Most claimants will not be in the spe-
cific situation confronting Gaddis and Starr, but instead will be unem-
ployed. The Ford Motor Co. rule indisputably encourages employers to
191. 424 U.S. at 776-77.
192. Ford Motor Co., 102 S. Ct. 3057, 3064 (1982).
193. Id at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. Id
195. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1288, 1292 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
196. Id
197. 645 F.2d 183, 193 (4th Cir. 1981).
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make offers of employment by freeing them from the threat of further
backpay liability. As a result, discriminatees will obtain employment as
promptly as possible. The Court's discussion of hypothetical situations
was useful in illustrating the new rule's utility. The rule also has the virtue
of clarity. The employer will understand precisely what to do to make a
valid offer of employment to a victim of hiring discrimination. The dis-
criminatee will know what to do in order to preserve rights to ongoing
backpay relief.
Finally, the majority's consideration of the rights of innocent third par-
ties arguably was not without merit.' 9 ' If the Court ruled that uncondi-
tional offers of employment must be accompanied by full retroactive
seniority status in order to be valid, the interests of many innocent incum-
bent employees indeed might have been adversely affected. Given the im-
portance of seniority status and its accompanying benefits, the Court's
concern with potential displacement of innocent employees was
justified.' 99
There may be, however, a middle-ground approach upon which the in-
terests of both the innocent incumbents and those of victims of discrimina-
tion may be fairly reconciled. For example, a distinction can be made
between benefit-type and competitive-type seniority status, as the Sixth
Circuit suggested in Meadows v. Ford Motor Co. 2 o A rule conceivably
could be adopted in which the job offer need include only benefit-type
seniority status in order to be effective to toll the further accrual of
backpay liability. An award of competitive-type seniority status, on the
other hand, could await consideration by the trial court. The interests of
both discriminatees and innocent employees could then be weighed to
reach the most equitable result for all concerned parties under the facts
and circumstances of a given case. This type of middle-ground rule has
the advantage of placing the burden of discrimination upon the employer,
the party responsible for the unlawful act. It also more fully compensates
the discriminatee, while not unfairly burdening the innocent incumbent
employee.
Other middle-ground approaches have been suggested. Chief Justice
Burger has suggested that an award of "front pay" might replace competi-
tive-type seniority status.2°" This award is one of monetary damages paid
198. 102 S. Ct. at 3069-70.
199. See supra notes 70, 186-87 and accompanying text.
200. 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). For a full discussion
of Meadows, see supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
201. Franks, 424 U.S. 747, 781 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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by the employer at the time the discriminatee is hired. Burger explained
that such an award would assist in deterring the employer's unlawful dis-
crimination while protecting the interests of incumbent employees.20 2 One
commentator has suggested that "equal or dual seniority" be granted by
the employer to the claimant and the incumbent employee within the hier-
archy of seniority in the position which the claimant would have held were
it not for the discrimination. 0 3 Under this approach, the employer would
be required to promote, transfer, layoff, and recall the two employees at
the same time.2 1 The incumbent would still be adversely affected, but he
or she would not be totally displaced by a discriminatee. Another com-
mentator has suggested that employers and unions could devise appropri-
ate seniority schemes and collective bargaining agreements in which
options such as inverse seniority, work sharing and alternative layoffs
could be incorporated. 20 5 These options would help to minimize the dam-
aging effects of full retroactive seniority status for discrimination victims
upon the interests of incumbent employees.
These suggestions demonstrate that there are equitable means of com-
promise available which are not hampered by the rigidities of the either-or
rule devised by the Ford Motor Co. Court. The rigid rule will have an
adverse impact upon some title VII litigants. To the extent that it permits
an employer to escape backpay liability unilaterally and inexpensively by
making an incomplete offer of employment, settlements are likely to be
more favorable to the employer than to the claimant. One can also specu-
late that weakening the negotiating position of the title VII claimant may
increase the frequency of settlements and thus place less burden on the
courts. That is not, however, a sufficient reason to adopt an otherwise un-
justified rule.
Although the Court does not prohibit employers from offering retroac-
202. 424 U.S. at 781. Cf. Note, Front Pay--Prophylactic Relief Under Title VII of the
Civil RightsAct of 1964, 29 VAND. L. REv. 211 (1976) (suggesting that front pay is not an
adequate substitute for retroactive seniority status relief, but could be supplemental relief to
achieve the "make whole" title VII objective).
203. Ziskind, Retroactive Seniority: ARemedyfor Hiring Discrimination, 27 LAB. L.J. 480,
489 (1976).
204. Id Although the employer may be required to overstaff and bear other financial
hardship, he is, after all, the party who committed the wrong. Id
205. Behman, The AfftrmativeAction Position, 27 LAB. L.J. 490, 495-96 (1976). Coopera-
tion between labor and management makes possible judgments not possible through the
judicial system. Id at 496-97. See generally United States Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979) (collective bargaining agreements offering complete reinstatement, including sen-
iority rights, to individuals alleging discrimination deemed permissible).
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tive seniority, it does not provide them any incentive to do So.2 0 6 Future
title VII claimants can fairly expect that to receive the seniority status
rightfully theirs, they may have to endure lengthy lawsuits and, in the in-
terim, enjoy reduced job benefits and privileges. Ford Motor Co. will
probably have its greatest pernicious impact, however, upon those victims
of hiring discrimination who mitigate damages by finding alternative em-
ployment and accumulate some seniority prior to receiving job offers from
the discriminating employers. Under the Court's rigid rule, a victim's right
to backpay relief will be automatically severed should he or she refuse the
employer's offer. The diversity and complexity of circumstances possible
in individual situations of discrimination may go unexamined by courts
that steadfastly apply this rule. Like Gaddis and Starr, future title VII
litigants in this untenable position may no longer be able to rely upon the
trial court to achieve the most equitable result possible given the facts pe-
culiar to their cases.
The Court did provide an exception to its rule.20 7 Its suggestion that it
will be rarely invoked, however, coupled with Gaddis and Starr's failure to
fall within the "special circumstances" exception, renders the exception ex-
tremely narrow and of questionable viability.208 Indeed, given the Court's
new rule cutting off an employer's backpay liability, Gaddis and Starr may
not be the only victims of discrimination who will not be "made whole"
under title VII.
III. CONCLUSION
In Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court devised a new rule
governing awards of backpay under the general remedial provision of title
VII. The Court held that an employer's unconditional offer of employ-
ment absent retroactive seniority made to a hiring discriminatee is effective
in tolling the further accrual of backpay relief. The decision reversed the
Court's recent trend favoring the most complete backpay relief possible for
victims of employment discrimination.
By departing from an established standard of flexible principles of ap-
pellate review, the Court opened itself to the criticism that it is undermin-
ing the trial court's unique abilities to fashion an appropriate backpay
award on the basis of its greater knowledge of a case's facts and circum-
stances. The rule will properly vindicate the rights of most title VII claim-
206. Justice Blackmun noted that future awards of retroactive seniority will in all likeli-
hood only be court-ordered. 102 S. Ct. at 3077 n.14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
207. Id at 3069 & n.27.
208. Id "Curiously," the Court did not explain-why the facts of this case failed to meet
its "exceptional circumstances" test. ld at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ants. Its rigidity, however, may produce results incompatible with the
statute's "make whole" objective. It can only be hoped that in future deci-
sions the Court will adopt a middle-ground approach in which title VII
claimants will not be required to forego accrued seniority benefits in order
to remain eligible for continued backpay relief.
It is more likely, however, that the Court will temper its harsh rule by
expanding the "special circumstances" exception. Such an expansion may
return discretionary powers to the trial court where countervailing interests
of discriminatees and incumbent employees may be weighed to achieve the
most equitable result possible. Full backpay relief may then be awarded to
further, not dilute, the "make whole". objective of title VII.
Laurie 4. Lewis

